The Compromise of One’s Personal Information: Trait Affect as an Antecedent in Explaining the Behavior of Individuals by Dupuis, Marc & Crossler, Robert
The Compromise of One’s Personal Information:  
Trait Affect as an Antecedent in Explaining the Behavior of Individuals 
 
Marc J. Dupuis 
University of Washington 
marcjd@uw.edu 
Robert E. Crossler 
Washington State University 
rob.crossler@wsu.edu  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This research examined the role trait affect, a 
lifelong and generally stable type of affect, has on the 
information security behavior of individuals. We 
examined this in the context of how one responds to the 
threat of one’s personal information becoming 
compromised. This was done by extending Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT) by incorporating the two 
higher order dimensions of affect, positive affect and 
negative affect, as antecedents to self-efficacy, 
perceived threat severity, and perceived threat 
vulnerability. A survey was used to explore this further. 
Seven of the 11 hypotheses were supported, including 
three of the six related to affect. This research makes 
two primary contributions. First, trait affect may play 
an indirect role in understanding how individuals 
evaluate, respond to, and cope with a threat. Second, 
this research extended the application of PMT, which 
has been the primary theory used to understand the 
information security behavior of individuals. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Computers provide people with a wide range of 
benefits, such as connecting with friends, shopping for 
items, and sending emails. In addition to the many 
benefits computers provide to people, there are inherent 
risks. These risks exist in many different forms; the 
compromise of one’s personal information arguably 
being the most significant, which can occur through 
something as simple as a post on a social networking 
site [1]. This is particularly important given the general 
lack of knowledge individual users have with respect to 
technical and non-technical controls related to privacy 
and security [2].   
In an organizational setting, compliance with 
security policies is mandatory. Organizations have paid 
a considerable amount of time, money, and attention to 
information security with positive outcomes. This 
includes investment in security education, training, and 
awareness (SETA) programs [3]. However, individual 
users are not a homogeneous group and most do not 
have any organized means of participating in a SETA 
program. Policies do not exist for individual users, nor 
are they required to engage in safe security behavior.  
Several factors have already been empirically 
associated with the security behaviors of individual 
users, including perceived threat severity, perceived 
threat vulnerability, self-efficacy, response efficacy, 
response costs, locus of control, and social influences. 
However, there is one factor that has been included less 
in comparison in research on individual users’ 
information security behaviors—affect. Fortunately, 
there has been greater recognition of the important role 
affect may play in information security research [4].  
Research in the decision-making domain has shown 
that affect influences individuals’ risk perceptions [5] 
and their self-efficacy [6]. Risk perceptions and self-
efficacy have both been associated with individual 
users’ information security behaviors, suggesting that 
affect may provide some additional and important 
insights in this area. 
This research helps to close the gap in existing 
research by examining the role of trait affect on the 
information security behavior of individual users. 
While organizations may care little about the 
information security behavior of individual users 
outside the confines of the organization, all users within 
the organization are also individual users. Thus, their 
behavior, habits, and perceptions of information 
security risk, and their ability to counter significant 
threats should be of great interest to organizations. 
Likewise, by examining the behavior of individual 
users outside of the organization we were able to test 
our hypotheses ‘policy free’ and thus control for the 
influence and inconsistency of policies across 
organizations.  
Overall, this research makes two primary 
contributions. First, trait affect may play an indirect role 
in understanding how individuals respond to and cope 
with a threat. Second, this research extended the 
application of Protection Motivation Theory, which has 
been the primary underlying theory used to understand 
the information security behavior of individual users.  
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2. Literature Review  
 
2.1. Protection Motivation Theory 
 
PMT was developed in 1975 by Rogers as an 
extension of expectancy-value theory to provide a more 
complete understanding of the effects of fear appeals on 
attitude change [7]. A fear appeal is a communication 
regarding a threat to an individual that provides 
information regarding one’s well-being [8]. In PMT, 
two independent appraisal processes occur as a result of 
a fear appeal: threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Six 
components of a fear appeal have been articulated, 
three for each of the appraisal processes [8]. Threat 
appraisal consists of: 1) the severity of the perceived 
threat, based on prior research showing that the 
manipulation of fear will affect the perceived severity 
of the threat; 2) the vulnerability to the perceived threat, 
noted in prior research to increase as fear-appeals go 
from low-fear to high-fear; and 3) rewards, both 
intrinsic and extrinsic, such as personal satisfaction or 
fulfillment and social acceptance by peers.  
In contrast to threat appraisal that is believed to 
inhibit maladaptive responses, coping appraisal is 
concerned with the factors that determine whether an 
individual will cope with and avert a specific threat [8]. 
Coping appraisal consists of: 1) the perceived 
effectiveness of a counter-response (perceived response 
efficacy), reported to increase compliance with 
recommendations as the perceived effectiveness of the 
recommendations increased [8]; 2) perceived response 
costs, considering the cost (time, effort, financial, etc.) 
of the adaptive response; and 3) belief that the 
individual can effectively perform the counter-response 
(self-efficacy), with prior research showing a positive 
correlation between self-efficacy expectancy and 
changes in behavior (assumed causal relationship) [8].  
 
2.2. Trait Affect 
 
Affect influences or alters how individuals perceive 
things.  These altered perceptions have an effect on the 
decisions people make [5]. This may occur through 
affect’s influence on how people perceive risk, as well 
as how people formulate their self-efficacy expectations 
related to a specific situation [9]. Earlier, we discussed 
the important role that constructs related to threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal have had in 
understanding the information security behavior of 
individual users. Understanding the antecedents of 
these constructs is an important step in developing a 
more complete understanding of the behavior of 
individual users with respect to information security.  
Although research with affect has been conducted in 
IS research, there has been a significant lack of 
consistency in what is meant by affect and how it 
should be measured [10]. A few of the ways it has been 
conceptualized within this research includes 
microcomputer playfulness [11], perceived enjoyment 
[12], computer anxiety [13], etc.  
There have been several different theoretical 
approaches used within IS research that have employed 
an affect type construct. For example, the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA), the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB), and the Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM) all include a construct that assesses an 
individual’s attitude towards a behavior [14]. Attitudes 
consist of the beliefs about a specific behavior and are 
weighted by evaluations of these beliefs. These 
attitudes may consist of some affective descriptors (e.g., 
happy), but generally speaking they are far removed 
from what would be typically termed affect. 
While some research has examined the role of affect 
on behavior in the IS domain in general, less has 
focused on information security behavior in particular. 
An exception to this is a study that examined social 
networking sites and the role affect has on the 
implementation of security safeguards. Drawing on 
Social Capital Theory, Wu, Ryan, and Windsor [15] 
employed three social capital constructs – structural 
capital, relational capital, and cognitive capital – as 
antecedents of affect towards social networking sites. 
Affect in their study was operationalized in the same 
manner as by Compeau and Higgins [16] – as a positive 
attitude toward a technology. This study provides 
support for the underlying argument of the current 
study, namely, that affect may help to explain the 
information security behavior of individuals. Other 
exceptions focused on social networking [17] and 
computer abuse within an organization [18]. 
 
2.2.1. Affect, Mood, and Emotion. Affect has come to 
mean several different things in existing literature and 
has often been used interchangeably with mood and 
emotion [19]. While this is understandable in one 
respect since they are all interrelated concepts, it also 
poses significant difficulties for the study of affect as it 
makes it inherently difficult to compare studies, let 
alone validate existing ones.  
For the purposes of this research, emotion can be 
characterized as a generally short-lived and intense 
reaction to an event or stimulus, whereas mood is 
longer-lasting and milder in degree [20]. Both of the 
terms represent a type of affect and can be classified as 
affective states [21]. Affective states include: fear, 
sadness, guilt, hostility, shyness, fatigue, surprise, 
joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness, and serenity 
[22]. However, they only represent a portion of the 
broader concept of affect. Mood and emotion fluctuate 
over time and vary in intensity. In contrast, trait affect 
changes little over one’s life and is generally stable 
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over time. In many respects, trait affect is similar to 
personality in this regard [23]. 
Exploring the role of trait affect on the risk 
perceptions of individuals in the information security 
domain has several advantages over that of state affect. 
First, it is a broader perspective that can help inform 
research on state affect. Second, trait affect is generally 
stable over time and context free [22]. Third, trait affect 
is not dependent on single affect-eliciting events (e.g., 
having ice cream may make someone happy in the 
moment). Thus, trait affect is a logical starting point for 
work examining the role of affect on the information 
security behavior of individual users.  
The predominant approaches taken in 
conceptualizing affect have been valence-based. This 
includes affect as either positive or negative on a 
bipolar continuum [5], and positive affect and negative 
affect as two distinct dimensions [24]. The former 
approach has largely been replaced by the latter in 
recent years due to its higher degree of convergent and 
discriminant validity [25]. Positive affect is related to 
the frequency of pleasant events and satisfaction, 
whereas negative affect is related to stress and poor 
coping [24]. An individual with high positive affect 
does not necessarily have low negative affect and vice 
versa as they are largely independent dimensions. Thus, 
it is possible for an individual to have high positive 
affect and high negative affect, simultaneously. 
 
2.3. Research Model 
 
The research model that follows includes five 
constructs that act as determinants of the information 
security behavior of individual users. Two of these 
constructs account for an individual’s risk perception—
perceived threat severity and perceived threat 
vulnerability. The other three constructs account for 
coping appraisal in PMT—perceived response efficacy, 
perceived response costs, and self-efficacy.  
While the model itself is based on PMT with the 
additional components of trait positive affect and trait 
negative affect, we did not measure behavioral 
intentions, which is a central component of PMT [7]. 
There are three primary reasons for this. First, the 
relationship between intention and behavior has 
generally been weaker than has often been assumed 
[26]. Second, the responses required to mitigate the 
threat of personal information compromise may have 
largely become habitual for most users, which has been 
problematic for the intention-behavior relationship [27]. 
Finally, we are concerned with the individual user’s 
current behavior, not how it may change in response to 
an experimental manipulation.  
 
2.4.1. Information Security Behavior. Self-efficacy 
has been shown to vary based on the task under 
investigation [28]. Self-efficacy needs to be context-
specific [29]. In this research we examined the threat of 
one’s personal information being compromised and the 
nine responses found to be required to effectively 
mitigate this threat [30]. The importance of privacy and 
preventing one’s personal information from being 
compromised by malware and other sources has been 
examined in several studies on individual users in both 
a personal and professional context (e.g., [31]). 
 
2.4.2. Determinants of Information Security 
Behavior. In PMT, threat appraisal occurs as a result of 
a fear appeal, which stems from environmental and 
intrapersonal information. Threat appraisal consists of 
perceived threat severity, perceived threat vulnerability, 
and rewards, both intrinsic and extrinsic [8]. Perceived 
threat severity is the level of noxiousness elicited from 
a fear appeal.  
Threat appraisal is believed to inhibit maladaptive 
responses, such as avoiding the creation of strong 
passwords (i.e., avoidance) or convincing one’s self that 
there is no risk associated with running a computer that 
does not have current anti-malware software installed 
(i.e., denial) [32, p. 83].  
H1: Higher levels of perceived threat severity 
related to the compromise of one’s personal 
information are associated with higher levels of 
performing the responses necessary to mitigate this 
threat. 
H2: Higher levels of perceived threat vulnerability 
related to the compromise of one’s personal 
information are associated with higher levels of 
performing the responses necessary to mitigate this 
theat. 
Coping appraisal is believed to increase the 
likelihood of an individual engaging in an adaptive 
response (e.g., running back-ups of data) to mitigate a 
threat. It consists of perceived response efficacy, 
perceived response costs, and self-efficacy. Higher 
levels of perceived response efficacy and self-efficacy 
are believed to lead to greater levels of choosing an 
adaptive rather than a maladaptive response [8]. 
However, if the perceived costs associated with an 
adaptive response are high, then the individual is less 
likely to choose an adaptive response.  
H3: Higher levels of perceived response efficacy 
related to the actions necessary to mitigate the threat of 
one’s personal information being compromised are 
associated with higher levels of performing these 
responses. 
H4: Higher levels of perceived costs related to the 
responses necessary to mitigate the threat of one’s 
personal information being compromised are associated 
with lower levels of performing these responses. 
H5: Higher levels of self-efficacy related to the 
responses necessary to mitigate the threat of personal 
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information compromise are associated with higher 
levels of performing these responses. 
 
2.4.3. Affect in Risk Judgments. One of the primary 
manners in which affect influences risk decisions is by 
the effect it has on how individuals perceive risk. This 
is important given the significant body of research that 
shows how people perceive risk, generally 
operationalized as perceived threat severity and 
perceived threat vulnerability, has been one of the 
major determinants of risk behavior in general [33], and 
in information security behavior in particular [34].  
There are two primary mechanisms through which 
affect is said to influence our risk perceptions: 
optimistic bias and mood maintenance. Optimistic bias 
involves those with a greater positive affect (and/or 
lower negative affect) will make more optimistic 
judgments related to risk than those with a higher 
negative affect (and/or lower positive affect) [35]. This 
is explained in part by the priming mechanism of affect. 
In contrast, the concept of mood maintenance involves 
individuals behaving in such a way so as to maintain 
their current mood [9]. For example, individuals that 
are happy do not want to behave in such a way as to 
change that state.  
These two mechanisms are contradictory to one 
another, but can be reconciled by understanding the 
context in which each one works. When the losses (i.e., 
risks) are hypothetical or small then the optimistic bias 
will generally take precedent. However, if the losses are 
large and not hypothetical in nature then the mood 
maintenance hypothesis has been shown to be more 
effective as an explanatory agent [9]. With respect to 
the compromise of one’s personal information, the 
mood maintenance mechanism is more appropriate 
given the very real and large impact consequences such 
as identity theft, financial losses, embarrassment, and 
reputation damage can have on an individual. 
Thus, individuals with higher levels of positive 
affect are more likely to see risky situations as 
something they would just assume avoid. As a result, 
they perceive something negative happening as more 
likely than those with lower levels of positive affect. 
Therefore, it is expected that higher levels of trait 
positive affect are associated with higher levels of 
perceived threat severity and perceived threat 
vulnerability. 
H6: Higher levels of trait positive affect are 
associated with higher levels of perceived threat 
severity. 
H7: Higher levels of trait positive affect are 
associated with higher levels of perceived threat 
vulnerability. 
Likewise, individuals with higher levels of negative 
affect are less likely to view the world and situations in 
a pessimistic manner. As a result, these individuals 
believe that their risks are lower than what they may 
actually be based on objective evidence.  
H8: Higher levels of trait negative affect are 
associated with lower levels of perceived threat 
severity. 
H9: Higher levels of trait negative affect are 
associated with lower levels of perceived threat 
vulnerability. 
 
2.4.4. Affect and Self-Efficacy. In addition to affect 
having an effect on how decisions are evaluated, it has 
also been shown to influence an individual’s self-
efficacy. Bryan and Bryan (1991) induced positive 
mood as part of an experimental manipulation and 
found that this resulted in higher self-efficacy for older 
children (junior to high school students), but not for 
those younger. Other results have also supposed affect’s 
influence on self-efficacy [6]. This optimistic thinking 
leads to increased levels of self-efficacy compared to 
those with lower levels of positive affect.  
H10: Higher levels of trait positive affect are 
associated with higher levels of self-efficacy related to 
performing the responses necessary to mitigate the 
threat of personal information compromise. 
Likewise, those with higher levels of negative affect 
are more likely to make pessimistic evaluations in their 
ability to perform a task successfully. Therefore, it is 
expected that higher levels of trait negative affect are 
associated with lower levels of self-efficacy related to 
performing the responses necessary to mitigate the 
threat of personal information compromise. 
H11: Higher levels of trait negative affect are 
associated with lower levels of information security 
self-efficacy related to performing the responses 
necessary to mitigate the threat of personal information 
compromise. 
Based on hypotheses developed from the above 
discussion, the research model in Figure 1 (see section 
4) was developed with the results noted therein. 
  
3. Methods  
 
This study explored the role trait affect has with the 
information security behavior of individual users in 
response to the threat of one’s personal information 
being compromised. Previously developed and 
validated survey instruments for both the dependent and 
independent variables were used; the indicators for the 
PMT constructs were adapted from prior research.  
The model that was tested included two 
constructs—trait positive affect and trait negative 
affect—hypothesized to act as antecedents to three 
independent variables—perceived threat severity, 
perceived threat vulnerability, and self-efficacy. These 
three constructs, along with perceived response efficacy 
and perceived response costs, are hypothesized to have 
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a direct causal relationship with the information 
security behavior of individual users. Whereas trait 
positive affect and trait negative affect are hypothesized 
to have only an indirect effect on the dependent 
variable. 
 
3.1. Research Procedures 
 
Participants were recruited to complete the survey 
by using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The use of 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk offers several advantages 
over other recruitment methods (e.g., students, word of 
mouth, flyers, and electronic postings) and can be as 
valid as these other approaches [36].  For example, 
turnaround time can be quick and the cost per 
participant low when compared to other methods, while 
quality remains comparable to other recruitment 
techniques [36].  
The research itself consisted of a survey with a goal 
to obtain at least 310 usable responses based on a power 
analysis. This was done to help mitigate the chance of 
Type II errors, as well as ensure a large enough sample 
size for the number of paths in the model [37]. A meta-
analysis of PMT indicates that the lowest effect size out 
of the five independent variables used in the current 
study to measure PMT is 0.21 for perceived threat 
vulnerability [33], which represents a low effect size 
[38]. Thus, using conservative estimates that included a 
one-tailed significance level of 0.05 (all hypotheses are 
directional), an effect size of 0.20, and a power of 0.80, 
the minimum sample size is 310 [38]. Therefore, the 
sample obtained of 556 participants met the minimum 
threshold of 310.  
The primary measurement tool used to examine 
positive and negative affect has been the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) [24]. PANAS has 
been the primary measurement tool in large part due to 
the extensive reliability testing and validation of this 
instrument [39]. The PANAS consists of 20 items with 
2 scales: positive affect (10 items) and negative affect 
(10 items) [24]. The instrument itself has been validated 
with several different time instructions, including an 
instruction for participants to indicate how “you 
generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the 
average” [24, p. 1070]. This time instruction is 
designed to measure trait positive and negative affect.  
 
3.2. Data Analysis Procedures 
 
In addition to testing the structural model 
connecting various latent variables, it is also important 
to identify the measurement model, which links the 
indicators that can be measured to the unobservable 
latent variables [40]. The research model in this study 
included reflective, formative, and multidimensional 
constructs [41]. All indicators for the independent 
variables are reflective, but the measurement model 
also includes multidimensional aggregate constructs 
that are reflective first-order and formative second-
order. Additionally, the dependent variable for the 
complete aggregated model is formative first-order and 
formative second-order. Therefore, the measurement 
model is considered formative. The following 
constructs are reflective: trait positive affect and trait 
negative affect [24], and perceived threat severity and 
perceived threat vulnerability [42]. In contrast, some of 
the constructs were multi-dimensional aggregate 
constructs consisting of reflective first-order, formative 
second-order: self-efficacy [43], perceived response 
costs [44], and perceived response efficacy [42]. A 
previously developed and validated survey instrument 
was used to assess the actions needed to protect one’s 
self from the compromise of personal information and 
consisted of a formative first-order, formative second-
order construct [30]. 
One thing that should be noted are the indicators 
used for perceived threat vulnerability have been 
modified for this study. In several studies, this construct 
has been problematic (e.g., significant but in the 
opposite direction [34] or not supported at all [43]). We 
opine that if individuals are already engaging in 
protective behaviors then they will believe they are less 
vulnerable to the threat. Thus, any correlation between 
the two constructs would be negative rather than 
positive. The problem likely stems from its adaptation 
from experimental research to survey research in which 
we are more interested in current behavior rather than 
people’s perception of their vulnerability to a threat in 
the wake of a manipulation [42]. Therefore, in the 
current study we included two sets of indicators for this 
construct: one set was modified with a qualifier and the 
other set was left unchanged. An example of an 
indicator with the qualifier is: “If I do not take 
appropriate steps to protect myself, then I would be at 
risk for having my personal information compromised.”   
 
4. Analysis 
 
4.1. Participants 
 
Respondents from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
provided pilot test data for this research.  There were 
109 responses to the survey with 12 being rejected for 
failing one or both of the attention check questions. 
This resulted in 97 respondents to pilot test the 
instrument.  Statistical analysis included tests for 
reliability, including Cronbach’s Alpha and composite 
reliability, as well as validity, including convergent and 
discriminant validity.  
After making some minor wordsmithing changes 
based on data collected from the pilot study, we 
conducted the main study with a significantly larger 
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sample size. The main change that was made involved 
one of the indicators for response costs that was worded 
opposite of the other indicators; this was changed for 
the main study to make it consistent. We received 607 
responses with 51 being rejected for failing one or both 
of the attention check questions. This resulted in a final 
sample size of 556. This number was deemed sufficient 
as it was greater than the minimum threshold of 310 
that was established through the power analysis 
discussed in the methods section. Participants were 
compensated $1.00 for participating in the survey. 
We also collected certain demographic information 
from the participants. This included gender, highest 
education level attained, age, state of residence, and 
ethnicity. The state of residence information collected 
was converted into the four primary regions of the 
United States so that the participants from the main 
study could be easily compared with the United States 
population as a whole. Likewise, the age information 
collected was converted into fewer ranges to allow for 
easier comparisons. The gender of the participants 
consisted of a larger percentage of females than what is 
found in the U.S. population, but not by a large margin. 
Second, participants were generally more educated and 
younger than the average individual in the U.S. 
population. Finally, while the regional distribution of 
participants was quite similar to the U.S. population, 
there were a greater number of participants that 
identified themselves as white, Asian, or Pacific 
Islander than what is found in the U.S. To the extent the 
MTurk workers do not closely resemble the U.S. 
population, they do nonetheless provide good degree of 
diversity on key demographic indicators [36]. 
 
4.2. Data Analysis 
 
4.2.1. Common Method Bias. The survey conducted in 
this research involved a single research method—
surveys. This can give rise to common method bias in 
which the method itself accounts for a large amount of 
the variance. One test that screens for common method 
bias is the Harman’s single-factor test. Although this 
specific test does have shortcomings [45], it can be 
helpful in determining if there are any significant issues 
with respect to common method bias. Less than 21% of 
the total variance was explained by a single factor, 
which is below the maximum threshold of 50%.  
In addition to testing for common method bias, it is 
also important to implement certain conditions a priori 
to minimize the likelihood of common method bias in 
the first place. In this research, the participants were 
anonymous to the research team and they were asked to 
simply answer honestly; both of these conditions help 
minimize the degree to which common method bias 
may impact results [45]. 
 
4.2.2. Reliability and Validity. The reliability is 
acceptable for all of the reflective constructs as 
demonstrated by both Cronbach’s Alpha and composite 
reliability values over the 0.700 minimum threshold 
[46]. Likewise, convergent validity is also acceptable 
with the composite reliability greater than the AVE for 
all of the constructs and more than the 0.500 minimum 
threshold [46]. Finally, the measures demonstrated 
discriminant validity with the AVE of the constructs 
greater than the square of the correlations with other 
constructs, as well as passing the cross-loading method 
of assessing discriminant validity [40]. All indicators 
loaded more highly on the construct they intended to 
measure than any other construct. Discriminant validity 
was also assessed and supported by using the 
Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) method [47]. 
The approach used to measure and model the 
multiple dimensions involved in the research model, 
which consists of both a formative first-order, formative 
second-order construct (dependent variable) and 
reflective first-order, formative second-order constructs 
(three of the independent variables), consisted of the 
process outlined in [48], [49].  
The results indicate that both trait positive affect and 
trait negative affect influence self-efficacy with the 
former also influencing perceived threat severity. Also, 
self-efficacy is an effective predictor of behavior, as 
noted in prior research [33]. Additionally, there is 
support for the hypotheses that perceived threat 
severity, perceived threat vulnerability, and perceived 
response costs influence the responses we engage in to 
mitigate the threat of having one’s personal information 
compromised. While perceived response efficacy was 
found to be significant at the 0.10 level, it did not meet 
our threshold of 0.05 that was established a priori. 
Therefore, seven of the 11 hypotheses were supported 
based on this research. Overall, the research model 
accounted for approximately 55.3% of the variance, 
which is quite high considering the exploratory nature 
of this research.  
As noted earlier, we modified the wording of the 
indicators for perceived threat vulnerability. The 
construct with the modified indicators was statistically 
significant with the dependent variable. When the 
structural model was calculated using the perceived 
threat vulnerability construct with the non-modified 
indicators it remained statistically significant, but in the 
opposite direction of what was hypothesized. Thus, the 
modification of the indicators for this construct appears 
appropriate for survey research in which a manipulation 
does not occur. 
Figure 1 includes the results for the research model. 
The structural model was calculated using Smart PLS, 
version 3.0 [50]. Complete statistical tables may be 
found at 
http://faculty.washington.edu/marcjd/hicss2019/    
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Personal 
Information 
Compromise
(R2=0.553)
Perceived 
Threat Severity
(R2=0.038)
Perceived 
Threat 
Vulnerability
(R2=0.003)
Trait Positive
Affect
Trait Negative
Affect
Self
Efficacy
(R2=0.081)
Perceived 
Response Costs
Perceived 
Response 
Efficacy
H7 (+)
H6 (+)
H8 (-)
H11 (-)
H9 (-)
H2 (+)
H5 (+)
H10 (+)
H1 (+)
H3 (+)
H4 (-)
Sig. @ < 0.05 level
Sig. @ < 0.01 level
Not significant
 
Figure 1. Trait Positive and Negative Affect and Personal Information Compromise
   
The complete results of our analysis are in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Research Model Results 
Hypothesis T Statistic Sig. Supported 
H1: TS -> PIC 2.913 < 0.01 Yes 
H2: TV -> PIC 2.090 < 0.05 Yes 
H3: RE -> PIC 1.567 0.059 No 
H4: RC -> PIC 2.812 < 0.01 Yes 
H5: SE -> PIC 8.010 < 0.01 Yes 
H6: TPA -> TS 4.185 < 0.01 Yes 
H7: TPA -> TV 0.992 0.161 No 
H8: TNA -> TS 0.312 0.378 No 
H9: TNA -> TV 0.558 0.289 No 
H10: TPA -> SE 5.037 < 0.01 Yes 
H11: TNA -> SE 2.209 < 0.05 Yes 
PIC: Personal Information Compromise 
TS: Threat Severity  |  TV: Threat Vulnerability 
RE: Response Efficacy  |  RC: Response Costs 
SE: Self-Efficacy  |  TPA: Trait Positive Affect   
TNA: Trait Negative Affect 
 
The previously developed instrument noted in the 
methods section was used to measure the dependent 
variable, while items adapted from Protection 
Motivation Theory and the PANAS [24] were used as 
the independent variables. Several tests were 
conducted to assess reliability and validity with minor 
changes made from the pilot study to the final study. 
All tests demonstrated acceptable levels of both 
reliability and validity. Likewise, the model explained 
a large amount of the variance—55.3 percent. Overall, 
seven of the 11 hypotheses were supported.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Conclusions about the Research Problem 
and Hypotheses 
 
The primary contribution this research makes is by 
incorporating trait affect into the research model. We 
did this by incorporating two constructs—one for trait 
positive affect and one for trait negative affect.  
Both trait positive affect and trait negative affect 
appear to have a role in how individual users respond 
to information security threats. This includes primarily 
through their association with self-efficacy. Likewise, 
the degree to which individuals believe a threat is 
severe is associated with their level of trait positive 
affect. Individuals that are generally happier are more 
likely to view threats as severe, which is. This is 
consistent with the desire of individuals to maintain the 
status quo with respect to affect.  
Prior research in the information systems domain 
that has examined the role of affect on the decisions we 
make has done this primarily by conceptualizing affect 
as how much an individual likes something, how much 
fun it is, and how interesting an activity may be [15], 
[51]. As discussed in the literature review section, the 
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term affect has been operationalized in numerous 
ways. This has made the study of affect particularly 
problematic. Therefore, we spent considerable time 
discussing affect, how it was being operationalized in 
the current research, and why. Likewise, we used 
previously validated instruments from the psychology 
literature to measure affect. This process has led to the 
conclusion that trait affect, one of the many different 
types of affect, appears to be related to the information 
security behavior of individual users. 
In addition to general conclusions that may be 
drawn about the research problem, we will discuss 
some of the issues related to the specific threat 
examined in this research.  
 
5.2. Personal Information Compromise 
 
Personal information compromise is a significant 
threat encountered by individual users. The current 
research suggests that those with higher levels of self-
efficacy, a greater perception of the severity of the 
threat and more vulnerable to it, as well as lower levels 
of perceived costs related to the measures necessary to 
mitigate this threat, are more likely to engage in such 
measures.  
Both of the antecedents examined here may lead to 
higher levels of self-efficacy as the level of trait 
positive affect increases and/or the level of trait 
negative affect decreases. Therefore, the relationship 
between these constructs and self-efficacy in this study 
is important and of great practical significance. At least 
for the threat of personal information compromise, 
individuals with higher levels of self-efficacy are more 
likely to perform the measures necessary to mitigate 
against this threat. Likewise, higher levels of trait 
positive affect are associated with higher levels of 
perceived threat severity.  
 
5.3. Implications for Theory 
  
With respect to Protection Motivation Theory, this 
research demonstrates the important role perceived 
threat severity, perceived threat vulnerability, 
perceived response costs, and self-efficacy may have in 
explaining human behavior.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
In contrast to a single theory, such as Protection 
Motivation Theory, affect has been studied, 
conceptualized, and operationalized in numerous ways. 
There is no single definition of affect in the literature. 
As a result, we deconstructed affect based on the 
literature so that it could be reconstructed in the most 
logical manner possible. Developing a narrow focus of 
the type of affect under investigation in this research 
allowed us to demonstrate in a more definitive manner 
that trait affect in general, and both trait positive affect 
and trait negative affect in particular, may play a role 
in understanding the information security behavior of 
individual users.  
The impact of trait affect on these two constructs is 
consistent with other research [15]. The primary 
implication for theory from this research is the need to 
conceptualize and operationalize affect in a very 
intentional and methodical manner for any study in 
which one wishes to measure it. It will be exceedingly 
difficult to compare different studies on affect if this is 
not done, let alone build upon our collective state of 
knowledge on the subject.  
 
5.4. Implications for Practice 
 
This research suggests that both trait positive affect 
and trait negative affect may act as antecedents to the 
information security behavior of individuals. While the 
focus has been on the individual user, employees of 
organizations are de facto individual users once outside 
of the organizational environment. Consequently, 
individuals with lower levels of trait positive affect 
and/or higher levels of trait negative affect may need 
additional encouragement and confidence building to 
improve their self-efficacy as it relates to performing 
information security tasks. This research is also 
consistent with other research on the connection 
between affect and self-efficacy [6]. Thus, 
organizations may view this connection in a more 
generic sense, even outside of the information security 
arena. Additionally, those with lower levels of trait 
positive affect may need additional messaging to 
convince them that they are vulnerable to the threat of 
having their personal information compromised. 
 
5.5. Limitations 
 
In this section, we discuss three possible limitations 
of this research. First, common method bias remains a 
possibility in any type of research in which a single 
method is used [45]. Although we did perform 
standard tests to check for it with no indications that it 
was a significant issue, common method bias cannot be 
ruled out completely.  
Second, social desirability bias may have caused 
some participants to answer questions in a manner 
consistent with what they believe is the socially 
acceptable answer [52].  
Third, the primary focus was on affect. There are 
several other types of affect that can and should be 
explored in future research in this area given the results 
found here, as well as countless other possible 
constructs that may provide additional insight into the 
information security behavior of individual users.  
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5.6. Further Research 
  
With the above limitations in mind, we discuss two 
future research directions. First, trait affect in the 
current study was operationalized as two separate 
constructs—trait positive affect and trait negative 
affect. Although the hypotheses associated with the 
two constructs were supported in half of the cases, 
their efficacy may nonetheless vary based on the 
context of the study, such as the specific threat under 
examination. Therefore, it will be important to examine 
the issues raised here by looking at other threats. 
Second, it may be prudent to consider other ways in 
which affect may be operationalized. This could 
include an examination of trait affect with a higher 
level of granularity than was done in this research, 
such as examining the lower dimensions of affect (e.g., 
joviality, self-assurance, hostility, sadness, and fear).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Seven of the 11 hypotheses examined here were 
supported, including three out of the six related to trait 
affect. Based on these results, this research makes two 
primary contributions.  
First, we know that both trait positive affect and 
trait negative affect may play a role in the information 
security behavior of individual users, primarily through 
their impact on self-efficacy, but also through trait 
positive affect’s impact on perceived threat severity.  
Second, this research extended the application of 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), which has been 
the primary underlying theory used by researchers in 
understanding the behavior of individual users. 
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